ISSN (print) - 0131-7652

ISSN (online) - 2686-7605

Vol. 51 No. 1 (2021)
PINNACLES OF ECONOMIC SCIENSE

The Auction as the Heart of Market Economy. Nobel Prize in Economics 2020

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  • Yu. Voronov
Yu. Voronov
Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, SB RAS; ООО “Korpus”; Novosibirsk National Research State University
Bio
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30680/ECO0131-7652-2021-1-151-169

Published 2021-01-13

Keywords

  • Nobel prize on economics,
  • auctions,
  • rules of trade,
  • auctions theory,
  • public procurement,
  • winner curse,
  • radiofrequencies,
  • industrial clusters,
  • rapid restructuring of production,
  • complementarity principle
    • ...More
    Less

How to Cite

1.
Voronov Ю. The Auction as the Heart of Market Economy. Nobel Prize in Economics 2020. ECO [Internet]. 2021 Jan. 13 [cited 2024 Dec. 21];51(1):151-69. Available from: https://ecotrends.ru/index.php/eco/article/view/4183

Abstract

The paper reviews the results of research for which the Nobel prize in economic sciences was awarded in 2020. The auction theory developed by the laureates is widely used all over the world, as well as specific auction formats they proposed.The prize was awarded for “development of auction theory”, but this paper shows that the laureates’ works fit into the broader context of problems of market economy.The most effective formats were auctions proposed by the laureates for the sale of radio frequency band licenses by the state.It is noted that the Russian economy uses auctions to much lesser extent, and, consequently, the innovations put forward by the laureates. This means that Russian economists have a lot of work to do in this direction.The author shows that many achievements of the laureates that go beyond the theory of auctions were not taken into account by the Nobel Committee. In particular, these are their works on the role of companies’ prestige in the market, as well as in organization of industrial production.
PDF (Русский)

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