ISSN (print) - 0131-7652

ISSN (online) - 2686-7605

Vol. 55 No. 2 (2025)
ECONOMY SECTORS AND MARKETS

Public Procurement in Turbulent Times: Which Industrial Enterprises Received Public Procurement Contracts in 2019–2022?

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  • Yu.D. Rodionova,
  • A.A. Yakovlev,
  • O.N. Balaeva
Yu.D. Rodionova
HSE University
A.A. Yakovlev
Harvard University
O.N. Balaeva
Graduate School of Business, HSE University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30680/ECO0131-7652-2025-2-128-140

Published 2025-04-02

Keywords

  • public procurement; manufacturing industry; international sanctions; small business

How to Cite

1.
Rodionova Ю, Yakovlev А, Balaeva О. Public Procurement in Turbulent Times: Which Industrial Enterprises Received Public Procurement Contracts in 2019–2022?. ECO [Internet]. 2025 Apr. 2 [cited 2025 Apr. 5];55(2):128-40. Available from: https://ecotrends.ru/index.php/eco/article/view/4850

Abstract

This paper analyzes how the participation of enterprises in public procurement under 44-FZ and 223-FZ changed in the context of the shocks of 2019-2022. The results of a survey of industrial enterprises conducted by the HSE Institute for Industrial and Market Studies in 2022 showed that in 2019-2022, about 30% of medium and large firms in the manufacturing industry had public procurement contracts, 26-27% of small firms in 2019-2021, and 24% of small firms in 2022. The empirical analysis showed that the established channels of communication between the state and business retained their influence on firms' access to public procurement contracts, except for the factor of receiving financial or organizational support from the government. At the same time, for small enterprises, the main of these channels were the business associations, for medium and large enterprises – the state participation in ownership and the proximity to Moscow.
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