ISSN (print) - 0131-7652

ISSN (online) - 2686-7605

Vol. 53 No. 7 (2023)
CROSS-BORDER INTERACTION

Do International Sanctions Always Achieve Their Purpose? Limitations of Sanctions Policies

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  • A.A. Fedyunina,
  • Yu.V. Simachev
A.A. Fedyunina
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Yu.V. Simachev
National Research University Higher School of Economics
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30680/ECO0131-7652-2023-7-95-107

Published 2023-06-28

Keywords

  • international sanctions; economic sanctions; compliance; effectiveness of sanctions

How to Cite

1.
Fedyunina А, Simachev Ю. Do International Sanctions Always Achieve Their Purpose? Limitations of Sanctions Policies. ECO [Internet]. 2023 Jun. 28 [cited 2024 Nov. 28];53(7):95-107. Available from: https://ecotrends.ru/index.php/eco/article/view/4630

Abstract

The paper discusses the content and effectiveness of international economic sanctions imposed on different states. It is shown that the latter are more often imposed comprehensively and use restrictions in several spheres at once, primarily financial and trade, as well as tourism and travel, regardless of the goal they pursue. The total number of sanctions has been increasing over time, mainly due to the expansion of pressure on low-income and lower-middle-income countries, with one-third of sanctions having been ineffective since the 1990s. Among the factors that determine the heterogeneous impact of sanctions, the authors highlight the specifics of the integration of the sub-sanctioned economy into global production linkages and the ability to transform cooperative ties in response to restrictions, the presence of large neutral partner countries, and the mobilization effect. The results of the study can be used to discuss and assess the effects of sanctions on the Russian economy.
PDF (Русский)

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