ISSN (print) - 0131-7652

ISSN (online) - 2686-7605

Vol. 52 No. 2 (2022)
Management

PPP Contract Risks

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  • P.N. Teslya
P.N. Teslya
Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, SB RAS; Novosibirsk State Research University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30680/ECO0131-7652-2022-2-68-92

Published 2022-02-03

How to Cite

1.
Teslya П. PPP Contract Risks. ECO [Internet]. 2022 Feb. 3 [cited 2024 Aug. 24];52(2):68-92. Available from: https://ecotrends.ru/index.php/eco/article/view/4383

Abstract

 Public-private partnership is considered as an institution formed on a contract basis. The risks of PPP projects are considered in the light of the principal-agent problem. The paper identifies the main forms of opportunistic behavior, their origins and threats to the effectiveness and feasibility of PPP projects. On the basis of a discussion of global experience, conclusions are drawn about the high riskiness of PPP. The potential benefits measured by the VFM indicator are usually inflated in order to hide the opportunistic effects derived by the parties to PPP contracts. PPPs are often used to disguise the privatization of public property by private partners. The experience of China, which has actually abandoned the partnership between the state and private firms, is particularly noteworthy. The preference is given to the partnership between the state and state-owned companies.
PDF (Русский)

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