ISSN (print) - 0131-7652

ISSN (online) - 2686-7605

Vol. 56 No. 1 (2026)
Cover story: the “Price” of Prices

Application of Multi-Object Auctions for efficient Allocation of Scarce Resources

Requires Subscription or Fee PDF (Русский) (RUB 200)
  • A.Yu. Filatov
A.Yu. Filatov
Far Eastern Federal University
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30680/ECO0131-7652-2026-1-41-59

Published 2026-01-29

Keywords

  • mechanism design; multi-object auctions; experimental economics

How to Cite

1.
Filatov А. Application of Multi-Object Auctions for efficient Allocation of Scarce Resources. ECO [Internet]. 2026 Jan. 29 [cited 2026 Jan. 30];56(1):41-59. Available from: https://ecotrends.ru/index.php/eco/article/view/4935

Abstract

The paper proposes an effective mechanism for allocation of a scarce resource that allows for increased market competition and social welfare growth, as well as encouraging new entrants to the market. The mechanism is based on a multi-object uniform price auction, which as pilot experiments have shown, works better in practice than the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, ideal in theory but difficult to understand for most participants, and the generalized first-price auction, which is unstable in the presence of irrational rival behavior. The mechanism can be used to allocate any homogeneous product, from access to nature reserves to railway capacity and airline tickets. Both collective and individual bidders can potentially participate in the auction. And the use of new features (e.g. not only staggered but also linearized bids) further increases the efficiency of the mechanism.
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