From the Theory of Hierarchical Games to Optimal Contracts for Higher Education

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the incentive system for strategic development of the organization of higher education. The author introduced the system of rating evaluation of higher school faculty staff, departments and faculties in the Altai state university. For efficient contract performance the author has proposed and successfully implemented the new type of hierarchical game, mechanism design model and the auction theory. This incentive system at ASU has identified the limit opportunities of the faculty staff for reaching KPI by using direct game, in which to tell the truth about abilities is optimal for each player. The sum of values for all effective contracts of the faculty staff allowed increasing an influence for strategic development of the University. The implementation of the incentive system at ASU has become one of the main tools that allowed to provide a serious breakthrough in the development of the University for just a few years and to raise the its level to leading universities of Russia.